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Abstract
Coincidence of Bargaining Solutions and
Rationalizability in Epistemic Games
by
Todd Stambaugh
Adviser: Professor Rohit Parikh
This dissertation consists of two chapters. . .
Chapter 1 In 1950, John Nash proposed the Bargaining Problem, for which a solution is a
function that assigns to each space of possible utility assignments a single point in the space,
in some sense representing the ’fair’ deal for the agents involved. Nash provided a solution
of his own, and several others have been presented since then, including a notable solution
by Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky. In chapter 1, a complete account is given for the
conditions under which the two solutions will coincide for two player bargaining scenarios.
Chapter 2 In the same year, Nash presented one of the fundamental solution concepts of
game theory, the Nash Equilibrium. Subsequently this concept was generalized by Bernheim
and Pearce to the solution concept of rationalizability. Each involves a consideration of
the beliefs of the agents regarding the play of the other agents, though in many strategic
situations, payoffs depend not only on the actions taken, but also some facts of the world.
The main result of chapter 2 is to define rationalizability for a class of such games known as
Epistemic Messaging Games.
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Chapter 1
Coincidence of Bargaining Solutions
In interpersonal interactions, business negotiations, intergovernmental diplomacy, and a wide
variety of other contexts, notions of fairness play an essential role. In general it is obviously
quite difficult to determine what is a fair outcome to an interaction. Even in situations
where calculating the benefits gained for each side is reasonably simple, the answer to what
fairness means is still not necessarily clear.
In his 1950 paper, The Bargaining Problem [Nas50], John Nash gave an axiomatic account
of fairness in such scenarios. According to this approach, for any bargaining situation, one
could determine a single fair bargain (or set of equivalent bargains) according to certain
fairness properties. While the axioms for this solution seem reasonable, one in particular,
the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), came under some criticism. Partly as a
result of this criticism, in 1975 Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky presented a new solution
to the problem which avoided the IIA axiom entirely by more or less replacing it with a
monotonicity condition [KS75].
These two solutions will yield the same bargain in certain situations, and different bar-
gains in others, meaning the two accounts of fairness differ not only philosophically, but
practically. Determining when the two will agree and disagree can help us differentiate be-
1
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tween those situations in which what is fair is in a sense obvious and those in which fairness is
harder to pin down. This in turn can illuminate the practical implications of differing notions
of fairness and whether our intuitions about fairness are reflected in the given axioms.
1.1 Formulation of the Problem
A two-person bargaining situation can be represented as a pair pa, Sq, where S is a subset
of R2 and a “ pa1, a2q is a point in S called the base point or disagreement point. Every
point x “ px1, x2q P S represents the utilities, to agents 1 and 2 respectively, of reaching a
particular deal, with the base point representing the utilities received if the negotiations are
abandoned. Every pair pa, Sq must satisfy the following properties:
Dx P S such that xi ą ai for i “ 1, 2. (Bargaining Incentive)
S is convex. (Convexity)
S is compact. (Compactness)
@x P S, ai ď xi, for i “ 1, 2. (Individual Rationality)
Bargaining Incentive formalizes the natural assumption that both agents would only
engage in a bargaining situation in which they each stand to gain. If x “ px1, x2q and
y “ py1, y2q are the utilities associated to two potential bargains, any probability combination
of the two bargains would itself be a bargain, yielding utilities px`p1´pqy for some p P r0, 1s,
giving the convexity of S. Compactness in this context means that S is closed and bounded,
which is reasonable from the realistic features of many situations to which this work would
apply. Individual Rationality reflects the idea that no player would agree to a bargain in
which she is worse off than she would be not bargaining at all. This last condition is not
assumed by Nash, though all of his results still hold with this included, as it only limits the
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space of possible bargaining pairs. Again this is a natural requirement, as no player would
knowingly agree to a deal which gives a worse utility than disagreement would.
Let U be the set of all bargaining pairs pa, Sq with the above properties. A solution to
the bargaining problem is a function f : U Ñ R2 such that fpa, Sq “ pf1pa, Sq, f2pa, Sqq P S.
As described, Nash hoped to find a solution satisfying a general notion of fairness, so f was
meant to yield the ”fair” assignment of utilities for the two agents, though broadly read a
solution is simply a mechanism for assigning one particular pair of utilities to each bargaining
pair with no implication of fairness or other normative properties.
1.2 Normalized Bargaining Pairs
The two solutions we will consider are invariant under affine transformations of utility, i.e.
transformations of the form Apx1, x2q “ pc1x1`d1, c2x2`d2q for c1, c2, d1, d2 P R.1 This means
first that regardless the original base point a, we may consider without loss of generality
only the bargaining pairs of the form p0, Sq (by translating set so the base point becomes
the origin). Further, let
b1pSq “ sup
!
x1 P R
ˇˇˇ
there exists x2 P R, px1, x2q P S
)
b2pSq “ sup
!
x2 P R
ˇˇˇ
there exists x1 P R, px1, x2q P S
)
bpSq “ pb1pSq, b2pSqq is called the utopia point.
1Nash assumes this as a property of the utilities defined for each player. Kalai and Smorodinsky give
this as an axiom for a solution. Significant philosophical objections have been brought up regarding this
assumption including those by Rubinstein, et al. [RST92], but for the purposes that follow, we will ignore
these issues.
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As before, we may consider only bargaining pairs p0, Sq such that bpSq “ p1, 1q (by scaling,
we can still keep the base point p0, 0q).
A bargaining pair is called normalized if a “ p0, 0q and bpSq “ p1, 1q.
1.3 Nash Solution η
Nash gives three axioms2 regarding properties that a bargaining solution should satisfy, along
with philosophical justifications.
N1 Pareto Efficiency: For every bargaining pair pa, Sq, if x P S such that Dy P S with y1 ą x1
and y2 ą x2, then x ‰ fpa, Sq.
N2 Symmetry: If S is symmetric with respect to the line x1 “ x2, then f1p0, Sq “ f2p0, Sq.
N3 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): If pa, Sq and pa, T q are bargaining pairs
such that S Ă T and fpa, T q P S, then fpa, Sq “ fpa, T q.
N1 reflects the assumption that each agent is interested in maximizing her own utility.
We assume that the players are equally skilled at negotiating and none has any advantage
over the other, thus N2.
As previously mentioned, N3 has fallen under serious criticism, including by Kalai and
Smorodinsky themselves [KS75], but according to the intuition given by Nash, if two rational
individuals would agree that fpT q is fair if T were the set of possible bargains, then they
should also be willing to agree to the same deal with a smaller set S Ă T of bargains available
to them. If one thinks of fairness as a measurable property of each deal, then the deal with
2Nash discusses at length the assumption that the utilities are formulated in a way that implies that
a solution will be invariant with respect to affine transformations of utility. Essentially, he conceptualizes
the cardinal utilities as a representation of ‘preferences’ satisfying a linearity condition with no independent
notion of scaling, only relative scaling between preferences. This concept of utilities would subsequently be
refined, and so later work always considers this invariance a fourth axiom for the solution.
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‘maximal fairness’ will remain so even if some of the other candidates are removed from
consideration.
Nash proved that there is a unique function, η, given below, satisfying these three axioms.
ηpa, Sq “ pη1, η2q where pη1, η2q P S and
pη1 ´ a1qpη2 ´ a2q ě px1 ´ a1qpx2 ´ a2q for any x P S
ηpa, sq is the point in S that maximizes the product of the utility gains by the agents.
1.4 Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution µ
Kalai and Smorodinsky give a different set of axioms that a solution must satisfy, motivated
at least in part by issues raised regarding IIA. Before proceeding an additional function is
needed to describe the new condition.
Let gSpx1q “ sup
!
x2 P R
ˇˇˇ
x1 ď x11 and px11, x2q P S
)
pdefined for x1 ď b1q
Intuitively, gSpx1q is the greatest utility the agent 2 can be assigned if agent 1 is assigned
at least x1. A similar function can be defined for agent 1, but with symmetry, this is not
necessary.
KS1 Pareto Efficiency3: For every bargaining pair pa, Sq, if x P S such that Dy P S with
y1 ą x1 and y2 ą x2, then x ‰ fpa, Sq.
KS2 Symmetry: Let T : R2 Ñ R2 be defined by T ppx1, x2qq “ px2, x1q. For every bargaining
pair pa, Sq, fpT paq, T pSqq “ T pfpa, Sqq.
3Kalai and Smorodinsky use the term ”Pareto Optimality” for this condition.
CHAPTER 1. COINCIDENCE OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS 6
KS3 Invariance with Respect to Affine Transformations of Utility:
If A : R2 Ñ R2, Apx1, x2q “ pc1x1 ` d1, c2x2 ` d2q for constants c1, d1, c2, and d2, then
fpApaq, Apsqq “ Apfpa, Sqq.
KS4 Monotonicity: If pa, Sq and pa, T q are bargaining pairs such that b1pSq “ b1pT q and
gS ď gT (pointwise), then f2pa, Sq ď f2pa, T q.
The Pareto axiom remains unchanged. The purpose of the Symmetry axiom is the same,
though it is formulated differently. This version of Symmetry implies the Nash’s, though
both solutions satisfy both versions of the axiom anyway. KS3 can be justified in the same
was as it was for Nash, though Kalai and Smorodinsky may have been aware of the potential
objections. In any case, their aim was clearly to address the issues with IIA, and later work
would address solutions that do not include this axiom [Kal85].
KS4 reflects the idea that if for any demand agent 1 can make, the maximum possible
utility of agent 2 is higher for T than it was for S, then the utility for agent 2 under the
solution should not decrease when moving from S to T . In this situation, it is quite intuitive
that agent 2 has a better (or at least no worse) bargaining position in set T , so clearly she
should not be penalized for it.
Kalai and Smorodinsky also give a unique function µ which satisfies this new set of
axioms.
µpa, Sq “ pµ1, µ2q is the maximal point in S on the line through a and bpSq
µ is the point in S that maximizes the utility for each player while maintaining a ratio
of utility gains equal to that of the utopia point. Put another way, each agent is assign the
same proportion of their respective maximal utility gains.
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1.5 Coincidence of η and µ
Kalai and Smorodinsky showed by example that η does not satisfy KS4, so in general η ‰ µ
[KS75]. However, it is clear from the Symmetry axioms for both solutions that the two will
always coincide when S is symmetric about the line x1 “ x2. It turns out to be realtively
easy to build an example for which S is not symmetric, but the two solutions are the same,
meaning symmetry alone will not predict coincidence.4
Example. Let S 1 be the convex hull of the points p0, 0q, p1, 0q, p0, 1q, p.9, .9q, p.5, 1q, and
p1, .5q. It is easy to check that ηp0, S1q “ µp0, S1q “ p.9, .9q
Let S be the convex hull of p0, 0q, p1, 0q, p0, 1q, p.9, .9q and p.5, 1q which is clearly not
symmetric. S Ă S 1 both of which contain ηp0, S1q, so ηp0, Sq “ ηp0, S1q. Since bpSq “
bpS 1q “ p1, 1q and the line segment between p0, 0q and p.9, .9q is contained in S, ηp0, Sq “
ηp0, S1q “ µp0, Sq.
The natural question is whether there is a simple characterization of the properties of
pa, Sq for which ηpa, Sq “ µpa, Sq.
To approach this question, it is sensible to first restrict our attention to normalized
bargaining pairs for the sake of simplicity. Further it is intuitive to treat µ as a ”fixed” point
in a sense, since in general it is easier to find than η and also because µ is generally more
immune to small changes to S, as it is more concerned with ”global” properties of the set,
unlike the more ”locally” concerned η (see [Ser08]). Since normalized pairs fix many of these
properties, only substantial changes to the set will force a change in µ.
For normalized bargaining pairs, it is easy to see that µpa, Sq can be characterized as the
maximal point on the line x1 “ x2, and this point will also be ηpa, Sq just as long as there
is no point in x P S with x1 ¨ x2 ą µ1 ¨ µ2. Put another way, the two solutions will coincide
if and only if S and P “ tx P R2|x1 ¨ x2 ą µ1 ¨ µ2u are disjoint.
4Credit is due to Rann Smorodinsky for giving an example of such a bargaining pair, different from the
example included.
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Theorem 1.5.1. Let p0, Sq be a normalized bargaining pair.
ηp0, Sq “ µp0, Sq if and only if for every px1, x2q P S, x1 ` x2 ď µ1 ` µ2.
Proof. Suppose ηp0, Sq “ µp0, Sq. Then, by the definition of η, there is no point x P S that
is also in the set P “ tx P R2|x1 ¨ x2 ą µ1 ¨ µ2u. Since S and P are both convex, nonempty,
and disjoint, then by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem, there must be a hyperplane (a
line), separating them.
Since µ itself is part of the boundary of both sets, this separating line must also contain
µ, i.e. the line must be a supporting hyperplane for both sets. The only supporting line for
P at µ is the line tangent to P at µ, given by x1 ` x2 “ µ1 ` µ2.
Therefore, S must be contained in the half-plane bounded by this line that does not
contain P , i.e. for all x P S, x1 ` x2 ď µ1 ` µ2.
Suppose ηp0, Sq ‰ µp0, Sq. Then η P S X P , and since for all x P P , x1 ` x2 ą µ1 ` µ2,
there is at least one point in S, namely η, that fails to satisfy x1 ` x2 ď µ1 ` µ2.
Alternate proof. Let T “  px1, x2q P R2ˇˇx1, x2 P r0, 1s and x1 ` x2 ď µ1 ` µ2(.
Suppose for every px1, x2q P S, x1 ` x2 ď µ1 ` µ2. Clearly S Ď T , T is symmetric about the
line x1 “ x2, and p0, T q is a bargaining pair. By N2, ηp0, T q lies on the line x1 “ x2. Since
x1 ¨ x2 is strictly increasing on this line in the first quadrant, ηp0, T q must be the maximal
point in S on the line. Since p0, T q is normalized, this point must be µp0, T q “ µp0, Sq. By
N3, since ηp0, T q “ µp0, Sq P S, ηp0, Sq “ µp0, Sq.
Suppose there is a point x P S not in T . Without loss of generality let x “ pµ1`c, µ2`c´dq,
for some appropriate choice of c, d ą 0.5 Since p0, Sq is normalized, µ1 “ µ2. Since S
5We consider only the case where the point lies to the right of µ1. Using KS1, we can use this case to
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is convex, the line segment between µ and x is contained in S. Then the point x1 “
pµ1 ` ε, µ1 ´ c´dc εq P S for 0 ă ε ă c, as it is easy to check that this point lies on the
line segment between x and µ. Further, let ε ă mintc, d
c
¨ µ1u.
pµ1 ` εqpµ1 ´ c´ d
c
εq “ µ21 ´ µ1ε` dcµ1ε` µ1ε´ ε
2 ` d
c
ε2
“ µ21 ` dcµ1ε´ ε
2 ` d
c
ε2
pby the choice of εq ą µ21 ` ε2 ´ ε2 ` dc ε
2
“ µ21 ` dc ε
2
ą µ21
This means that there is a point in S, namely x1, for which x1x2 ą µ1µ2, therefore
ηp0, Sq ‰ µp0, Sq.
Geometrically, the two solutions are equal precisely if S lies below the line tangent to
x1x2 “ µ1µ2 at the point pµ1, µ2q.
Corollary. Let pa, Sq be a bargaining pair (not necessarily normalized).
ηpa, Sq “ µpa, Sq if and only if for every px1, x2q P S,
pµ2 ´ a2qx1 ` pµ1 ´ a1qx2 ď 2µ1µ2 ` a1µ2 ` a2µ1
This follows from the invariance of the solutions under affine transformations of utility.
Geometrically, we interpret the result the same as for the case for normalized pairs. This
means that the two solutions are equal precisely if S is contained in the half-plane below the
handle all other cases.
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line tangent to x1x2 “ pµ1 ´ a1qpµ2 ´ a2q at µ, which is precisely the line which bounds the
half-plane described by the given inequality.
Example. Let S 1 be the convex hull of the points p0, 0q, p1, 0q, p0, 1q, and p1´δ, 1q for δ P
p0, 1q. It is easy to compute that µp0, Sq “ p 1
1`δ ,
1
1`δ q, but S clearly violates the coincidence
condition, as p1´ δ, 1q is above the line x1` x2 “ 21`δ . It is left to the reader to show that if
δ ă 1
2
, then ηp0, Sq “ p1´ δ, 1q, otherwise ηp0, Sq “ p1
2
, 1
2δ
q.
1.6 Conclusion
While a general interpretation of these results is somewhat elusive, a specific subset of
possible bargaining pairs has a quite revealing property. If we limit ourselves to cases in
which the maximal utility gains for the two players are equal (i.e. b1 ´ a1 “ b2 ´ a2), it is
plain to see that µ will give equal utility gains to the players. For these situations, µ observes
the simplest version of the egalitarian principle of fairness. This alone is not enough to give
preference to this solution as even under these circumstances, other bargains may have a
justifiable claim to be closer to an intuitive notion of fairness.
That said, in such a bargaining situation that also satisfies the conditions given in the
above corollary, µ (and η) will also satisfy a basic utilitarian concept of fairness. In such
situation, the given solution will maximize the sum of the utility gains over the set. Put an-
other way, the two solutions will agree when the normalized form of the bargaining situation
has egalitarian and utilitarian interests aligned. It seems that under such circumstances,
there should be little argument about what a fair bargain would be, since the same bargain
is reached under four different interpretations.
This interpretation does not generalize to all bargaining pairs, since any version of an
egalitarian or utilitarian solution would not be invariant with respect to certain kinds of
affine transformations (as described completely by Kalai [Kal85]). This speaks to one of the
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fundamental difficulties in judging fairness in situations with incongruent scales of utility.
In any case, agreement between any two axiomatic solutions will never be a guarantee that
our abstract notion of fairness is satisfied by such solutions, though it seems a worthwhile
question to address in order to further pin down our intuitions and identify areas of conflict
between different conceptualizations.
Chapter 2
Rationalizability in Epistemic Games
A fundamental object in the study of the interactions between knowledge and behavior of
rational agents is the epistemic game. In general, an epistemic game with n players over a
set of propositions P is a function from T ˆA to Rn, where T is the set of truth assignments
over P , A “ śni“1Ai is the set of strategy profiles for the agents where each Ai is the set
of available actions for player i. The output of the function represents the payoffs for the
agents.
If the agents have some mechanism of learning about the truth assignment and affecting
the knowledge of other agents, they can tailor their strategies more effectively to potentially
attain a greater payoff. What follows is an account of a class of games called Epistemic
Messaging Games in which the agents engage in a period of communication, after which
strategies are chosen and the play of the game is completed. With this framework in place, a
definition for rationalizability in such games is proposed and examined for specific subclasses
of EMG.
12
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2.1 Extending Epistemic Games with Messages
For a particular n-player epistemic game (a function from T ˆ A Ñ Rn) further structure
will be added to address the state of knowledge resulting from communication that in turn
determines possible strategies on the part of the players. This begins with a representation
of that communication itself.
2.1.1 Messages
Let L be some language over P , and designate a subset M of L. P can be thought of as
the facts of the world under consideration, while L may have further expressive power (like
epistemic operators). It may be the case that while agents can reason about other agents’
knowledge, they are restricted to only sending messages of certain varieties designated by
the set M .
The games under considerations will have the structure that agents initially know nothing
regarding P , but learn about the truth values of propositions and other formulas through
various kinds of message passing. A message may be sent from one player to a collection of
other players or from nature to a set of players, in the sense that agents may learn about
the world from external stimuli.
In practice the messages that agents pass take a variety of forms, e.g. public, private,
asynchronous, etc., each creating its own epistemic ramifications. In a given situation, it
may be the case that only certain types of messages are available, so each game will have
associated to it a set Y of message types. It is easy to see that there are at least countably
many possible message types, though in the classes of games examined here, the sets of
message types will be finite.
The set of events, E is defined to be the set of all elements of the following three forms,
with R indicating the recipient(s) of the message, s P t0uYN the sender, υ P Y the message
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type, and ϕ PM the message:
• rnulls
• συs,Rpϕq : message ϕ of type υ sent from agent s to the set of agents R
• ρυs,Rpϕq : message ϕ of type υ received from agent s by the set of agents R
The structure of R will depend upon the message type. For example, in the context of a
group text message the set of recipients is simply a set, as no particular recipient has special
status of any kind, whereas in an email, the set of recipients is broken into two pieces, the CC
group and the BCC group. This division creates important distinctions between different
kinds of recipients, as those in the CC group are visible to all, but those in the BCC group
are not. This will have a significant effect on the epistemic states of the players, and thus
must be addressed in the structure of the event.
In principle, R could be a collection of agents with any kind of structure, with the message
type υ determining the structure R must take. We will proceed as if R is simply a set, as
the current work will not depend upon the distinction. The additional structure is merely
provided in anticipation of future avenues of research.
Note that the events in this framework do not include the possibility of simultaneous
sending or receiving of messages. This is an assumption for the sake of simplicity of the
model, which may at times betray the usual understanding of certain kinds of communication,
such as public announcements. In such cases, some requirements on the events following
a particular send event will be able to address the communicative properties at play, for
instance, requiring that immediately after the send event for a public announcement the
corresponding receive event must follow. For the classes of games of interest here, the
distinction between simultaneous and immediately adjacent events is inconsequential.
The type of a message affects two separate aspects of the model to come. First, different
message types will place restrictions on the structure of the global communication histories in
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play. For example, if a certain message type is guaranteed to be delivered within 5 steps, the
sender knows that any history in which there is a send event of this type will also contain a
corresponding receive event within 5 steps, whereas another message type may have different
properties, inducing different requirements on the history. These restrictions will have an
important effect on the epistemic states of the agents, but they only tell part of the story.
In addition to their structural effects on the history in play, different message types will
also change the knowledge of agents directly. For example, if a certain message type is
guaranteed to be delivered to all receivers and all receivers are visible to one another (as
with group text), then each receiver not only learns about the content of the message, there
is also common knowledge among the receivers regarding the content of the message. If,
on the other hand, the receivers are not visible to one another (as with a BCC in email),
there is mutual knowledge of the content of the message, but no additional beliefs can be
established about the knowledge of other agents.
Many of the message types will be defined based on real-world concerns regarding commu-
nications, including but not limited to whether or not delivery of the message is guaranteed,
how long before each sent message is received (if at all), whether messages are time stamped,
which recipients can see the sender and/or other recipients, whether the message is delivered
all at once or broken up into several receive events, and whether the content of messages
must have any specific properties, notably truthfulness. Fundamentally, each message type
is defined by the restrictions upon the histories in which they appear and the epistemic
consequences that result from their transmission.
The only blanket assumption for all message types is that nature will only send propo-
sitional messages. The main justification for this is that any time one learns about another
agent’s beliefs or knowledge, that agent must first have made that belief known in some way
to the world outside of their own mind. If this occurs through some intermediate process, say
by their writing that belief down, after which another agent comes across that writing, this
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can still rightly be viewed as an unintentional communication act without appealing to the
concept of nature as an intermediary. This is certainly not a rigorous justification, merely
a nod towards one, and perhaps in later work this stipulation can be relaxed or removed
entirely.
2.1.2 A History-Based Account of Knowledge
In recent tradition, the semantics for epistemic logic has been provided by Kripke struc-
tures. An essential feature of such models is that the agents have common knowledge of the
structure itself. This has been an overlooked assumption in much of the literature, recently
brought to light by Artemov [Art16].
For situations in which certain agents receive additional information while others do
not, the problem arises that we cannot simply transition to a new Kripke structure, since in
principle, some of the agents would not necessarily even know that any information had been
gained, and thus would have no reason to consider anything other than the initial model.
Since the state of knowledge did in fact change, additional structure needs to be in place in
order to model these situations appropriately.
One common approach to modeling knowledge in an environment in which agents’ epis-
temic states are changing is Dynamic Epistemic Logic, in which new structures are generated
as the hypothetical result of various information transmission actions [G`97] [VB01] [BMS16]
[SVE11]. As the name implies, this approach is especially valuable for examining the changes
in the epistemic states.
For the purposes here, the extension to messages is a mechanism to model a potentially
complex epistemic state, but one that is ultimately static. The communication and action
stages of the games are distinct, and our interest is in the strategizing that occurs after the
communication has already taken place. The approach used here to address this issue follows
work in distributed computing of Chandy & Misra [CM86] and later Parikh & Ramanujam
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[PR03], that is to use a history based model. The actual communications that take place
are viewed as one of many possible global histories of the message-passing stage of the game,
resulting in the epistemic state used by the agents at the action stage.
The set of possible histories for an Epistemic Message Game, denoted H, is the set of
finite sequences of events, i.e. the subset of Eă8, satisfying the conditions set forth by Y .
The one universal condition for all histories regardless of message types is that every receive
event must be preceded (not necessarily immediately) by a corresponding send event. Put
formally, for any history H “ ph1h2...hlq P H and any 1 ď t ď l, if ht “ ρυs,Rpϕq then there
must exist some t1 ă t such that ht1 “ συs,R1pϕq where R Ď R1. Notice that the receivers of
the message do not necessarily include all those to whom the message was originally sent, as
certain message types may not be received simultaneously for all recipients, or perhaps not
at all.
We will use H 1h to denote the history obtained by amending the history H 1 with the
event h and H 1H2 to denote the history where the events of H 1 are followed by those of H2.
Notice that H is defined in terms of N,M, and Y , (via E), so as long as these three sets
are provided, H is fixed.
2.1.3 Worlds
Finally, let W Ă T ˆH be the set of worlds, defined as the set of all pairs pν,Hq satisfying
all conditions specified under Y . There is no necessary connection between a given truth
assignment and the corresponding history, though later further restrictions will be placed on
the possible worlds establishing an important connection between the two. Again, given H
and Y , W is fixed.
If H “ H 1H2 for some H2 P Eă8 we say H 1 is a prefix of H and define the relation ď
on W by letting pν1, H1q ď pν2, H2q if ν1 “ ν2 and H1 is a prefix of H2.
For each i P N , define the function φi : W Ñ Eă8 where φipwq “ φipν,Hq is the
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subsequence of H including all elements of the forms συi,Rpϕq and ρυs,R1pϕq where i is in R1.
This function gives i’s local history at world w, which includes all events ’visible’ to i and
no others. This is the only access i has to the global history, though often i will be able
to extrapolate further information about the world from what can bee seen via her local
history.
Further, define w ”i w1 iff φipwq “ φipw1q. It is easy to see that this is an equivalence
relation, meant to indicate that to i, w and w1 are indistinguishable. If we take ”i to be i’s
accessibility relation on W , this gives a Kripke structure, allowing us to utilize the language
of epistemic logic with n agents over P , here denoted EMLnpP q, where each knowledge
operator is an S5 modal operator.
2.2 Definition of an Epistemic Message Game
Definition 2.2.1. An Epistemic Message Game (EMG), G, with n players is a tuple
G “ pP,
nź
i“1
Ai,
nź
i“1
Ui,L,M,Y , w˚q
The specified world w˚ indicates the actual world, including the history of communica-
tions among the players. Note that G is common knowledge among the players with the
exception of w˚, which each agent can see partially via φi.
Taking the history as fixed, instead of as a part of the play of the game will limit the
strategic considerations on the part of the players, and under certain conditions will prevent
them from knowing more about the states of knowledge of other players. While it is certainly
of interest to explore the reasons why a player may have sent a particular message, why a
particular set of recipients would have been chosen, what that would tell each of the recipients,
etc. and to treat these considerations as part of the strategy and reasoning on the part of
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the players, these questions are left for future work. Some work relevant to these questions
has been done, notably by Parikh, Tas¸dem?r and Witzel [PTW13]. The concern here is to
address the question of rationalizability given some knowledge state among the players of
the game. The communication history is simply the mechanism through which we and the
agents themselves will understand this state of knowledge.
One light in which one can view this approach is that it is well suited to model situations
in which at least some messages are sent unintentionally or in some sense non-strategically.
For example, consider two different corporations, A and B, each of whom plans to acquire
some piece of real estate. Naturally, they will each do preparations including researching
the site, meeting with the owner, etc. Whether or not A intends to communicate with B,
just by virtue of engaging in these preparations, some of which are publicly visible, A is
certainly broadcasting information about the availability of the property and its value to A.
Of course, this is why corporations generally take steps to conceal their activities from their
competitors.
Nevertheless, these messages were in some sense unavoidable and B certainly can’t take
them as a strategic choice on the part of A, beyond a sort of second-order consideration
that the cost of B’s learning the information was less than the benefit of the preparations
themselves. It is certainly possible that A would intentionally engage in activities such as
these to lead B to certain conclusions, but it seems plausible that B would not be able to tell
the difference, and so would still have to consider at least the possibility that the messages
weren’t sent on purpose.
Moreover, in many real contexts, agents may not be aware that they are poised to engage
in a game until after some communications have taken place between them. It is not un-
common for members of one organization to be recruited by competitors, abruptly switching
allegiances. For example. many head coaches in professional sports are hired after working as
assistant coaches for other teams often within the same league. Surely for a significant por-
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tion of their tenure with previous organizations, all sorts of information was shared without
a consideration for the eventuality of these opposing interests.
2.3 Truthful Messages and Knowledge Persistence
2.3.1 Message Restrictions
In order to ensure that communications are meaningful, we require all messages to be truthful
in a fairly strict sense. To ensure that a player is passing information that is true and will
remain so, we require that any message sent by a player must follow from information that
player has received previously.
Formally, we require that for all message types υ, receiver collections R, messages ϕ and
worlds w “ pν,Hq:
• If ht “ συ0,Rpϕq for some t, then w |ù ϕ and ϕ PM X LpP q.
• If ht “ συi,Rpϕq for some i P N and some t, then for some S Ď t1, ..., t´ 1u, there exist,
for each j P S, sj P t0u YN{tiu, Rj each including i, and ϕj such that hj “ ρυsj ,Rjpϕjq
and
Ź
jPSKsjϕj $ ϕ1.
This means that a player who receives a message from nature can pass the information
gained to another player, and that player can pass the information they gain from that
interaction, and so on. Each message received can have its truth traced back to a message
or collection of messages sent by nature.
A more hidden feature of these conditions is that by allowing agents to generate new
messages not simply from the content of the message they’ve received, but by the knowledge
of that content on the part of the sender, there is a tacit assumption that the sender of
1K0 is considered an empty operator wherever it may appear.
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each message is visible to the receiver(s)2. For these reasons to the second condition as the
Truthful Signed Message (TSM) condition. These conditions may be restricted further for
different υ.
2.3.2 Some Results
The effect of these restrictions is that the set W will only pair truth assignments with
appropriate histories, and eliminate entirely histories in which players send messages without
the prerequisite knowledge to do so. In order to show this, we first note the following lemma
giving a natural property of worlds.
Lemma 2.3.1. If w “ pν,Hq P W and H 1 is a prefix of H, then w1 “ pν,H 1q P W .
Proof. Each of the restrictions on the set of worlds involves events requiring some preceding
events as justification. Every event preceding ht in H
1 also preceded the same ht in H, so
the conditions will be met in the same way.
Since the worlds described in the above lemma are so closely related, we would expect
that certain classes of formulas would be preserved moving from one to another. Indeed,
since w can be thought of as the result of allowing further time for the agents to communicate
beyond that of w1, intuitively at least some kinds of statements ought to remain true. If one
knows that p is true, no matter what happens going forward, unless the truth value of p
itself has changed (which couldn’t happen for propositional p in this context), then it seems
one wouldn’t stop knowing p in light of being given more information.
Indeed, this property will hold for a specific class of formulas in EML, given below.
2While anonymous messages are certainly possible, their interest seems more in the strategy behind the
choice of anonymity rather than the resulting actionable knowledge for the receiver, and is thus left for future
work.
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Let EMLnpP q` (abbr. EML`), the set of positive epistemic formulas on n agents over
P , be defined as follows
• If ϕ P LpP q, then ϕ P EMLnpP q`.
• If ϕ, ψ P EMLnpP q`, then so are ϕ^ ψ and ϕ_ ψ.
• If ϕ P EMLnpP q`, then so is Kiϕ for each i “ 1, ..., n.
Theorem 2.3.2. If w1 ď w, ϕ P EML`, and w1 |ù ϕ, then w |ù ϕ.
Proof. We proceed by induction on complexity of ϕ
Suppose ϕ P LpP q. Whether w |ù ϕ depends entirely on ν, which is identical to ν 1, so
the result holds.
Suppose ϕ “ ϕ1 ^ ϕ2 and the result holds for ϕ1 and ϕ2. If w1 |ù ϕ, then w1 |ù ϕ1 and
w1 |ù ϕ2, so by the IH w |ù ϕ1 and w |ù ϕ2, therefore w |ù ϕ. Similarly for ϕ1 _ ϕ2.
Suppose ϕ “ Kiϕ1 for some i and the result holds for ϕ1 and let w1 ”i w. There is some
w11 ď w1 such that w11 ”i w1. Since w1 |ù Kiϕ1, it must be the case that w11 |ù ϕ1 and by the
IH then w1 |ù ϕ1. Since w1 was an arbitrarily chosen world i-equivalent to w, it must be the
case that w |ù ϕ.
Corollary. If w1 ď w, ϕ P EML`, and w1 |ù Kiϕ, then w |ù Kiϕ.
This means that if an agent has knowledge of some positive formula, then that knowledge
will persist through any further communication. This is not necessarily true of other kinds
of knowledge the agent can have as in the following example.
Example. In any world w1 with an empty history, for any agents i and j and proposition
p that happens to be true at w1, it is the case that w1 |ù Ki KjKip, since it is not the case
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that i knows p, and j cannot know something that is not the case and of course i knows all
of this.
Naturally, w1 is a prefix of any w with the same truth assignment, so in particular it is a
prefix of a world w at which p is true with history H “ συ0,ippqρυ0,ippqσυi,jppqρυi,jppq. Clearly, j
has learned p from i, and thus knows that i knows that p. As a result, it cannot be the case
that w |ù Ki KjKip, since w *  KjKip.
While this example clearly shows that there are some formulas that can be made false
through communication, this particular formula doesn’t seem to be terribly useful as far as
the question of rationalizability is concerned. If j doesn’t know some fact, j may behave as
if that fact is true or as if it is false. Whether i knows that j is ignorant of the situation
or not, i will still consider those behaviors on the part of j all the same, so the strategic
considerations need not have changed.
The restrictions placed on the messages that players send are built to preclude the possi-
bility that the kinds of messages in the above example are sent between players, as the value
of their knowledge is severely undermined if that knowledge may cease to exist, possibly
unbeknownst to the agent entirely. The following theorem shows that the truth of messages
received by players and the subsequent knowledge gained are not subject to falsification by
some later actions.
Theorem 2.3.3. For any choice of R, s P N Y t0u, w “ pν,Hq P W,υ P Y , i P N,ϕ P
EML X M , if ρυs,Rpϕq appears in H for R containing i, then w |ù KiKsϕ (w |ù Kiϕ if
s “ 0).
Proof. If ρυ0,Rpϕq appears in a history, then there must be a corresponding send event, and
thus ϕ must be a true propositional formula at that world. If ρυ0,Rpϕq appears in H, it also
appears in the history of any w1 ”i w, and so by the same reasoning w1 |ù ϕ and therefore
w |ù Kiϕ.
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The first message received in any history must either have been sent by nature (addressed
above) or be a tautology, in which case the result follows trivially, so the result must hold
for the first message received at any world.
Assume the result for each message received prior to ρυs,Rpϕq. If s “ 0, the above reasoning
still applies. Otherwise, let w1 be an arbitrary world such that w1 ”i w. For ρυs,Rpϕq at w1,
there is a corresponding send event συs,R1pϕq for which there exist k events ρυjsj ,Rjpϕjq where
s P Rj and Źkj“1Ksjϕj $ ϕ.
By assumption, for each j, w1 |ù KsKsjϕj and so w1 |ù
Źk
j“1KsKsjϕj, therefore w1 |ù
Ks
Źk
j“1Ksjϕj. Since
Źk
j“1Ksjϕj $ ϕ, this means that w1 |ù Ksϕ. Since w1 was an
arbitrary world indistinguishable from w, it follows that w |ù KiKsϕ.
Corollary. For any w “ pν,Hq P W,υ P Y , i P N,R Ď N,ϕ P EML XM , if συi,Rpϕq for
i P N appears in H, then w |ù Kiϕ.
Thinking temporally, these results show that once a message is received, the receiver
know that the sender knows the content to be true, and it continues to be true regardless
of what happens next. Similarly, a message sent, justified by some received knowledge, will
continue to be true throughout communications. This will have a stabilizing effect on the
reasoning of the players, since they need not worry about reconsidering matters that have
already been settled.
2.4 Prerationalizability
Before considering the information they have regarding P , agents can potentially eliminate
strategies on the same grounds as in traditional games.
Let γ´i represent the strategy profile of all the players except i from the overall profile γ,
and pγ´i ;αq the same profile with α inserted as i’s strategy.
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An action β P S is a best response in S to a profile γ at a world w “ pν,Hq P W if for all
α P S, Uipν, pγ´i ; βq ě Uipν, pγ´i ;αq, denoted BRpβ, S, γ, wq.
Notice that since the above definition does not appeal to the history at w, it must be the
case that if ν1 “ ν2, then BRpβ, S, γ, w1q iff BRpβ, S, γ, w2q
Similarly to the construction given by Pearce [Pea84], for a game G, and each i P N , let
Aip0q “ Ai and for m “ 1, 2, ... let
Aipmq “ tα P Aipm´ 1q| There exist w P W and γ P
nź
j“1
Ajpm´ 1q
such that BRpα,Aipm´ 1q, γ, wqu
Definition 2.4.1. Prerationalizability
The set of prerationalizable strategies for player i in a game G is PripGq “ Ş8m“1Aipmq.
The set of prerationalizable strategy profiles for G is given by PrpGq “śni“1 PripGq.
The term ‘prerationalizable’ is used here to emphasize that the reasoning that takes
place to reach these sets ignores potentially significant amounts of information available to
the players from their communications. These strategies are those that cannot be eliminated
in the case where no player knows anything about the truth assignment in the actual world.
This corresponds to the set of strategies that are rationalizable in the usual sense if we
consider nature to be another player for whom T is the set of possible actions and whose
utility function is constant.
It is worth noting that this set is computable completely from information that is common
knowledge to all of the players. For any reasoning that follows, every agent will proceed
with at least the knowledge that a rational agent will only ever play a strategy that is
prerationalizable, so each refinement of strategies will begin from PrpGq.
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2.5 Rationalizability Without Common Knowledge
After the communication stage of the game, players will almost certainly have asymmetric
information, and thus as they reason further, they may eliminate strategies for themselves
and others, while other players may not be able to eliminate those same strategies.
In order to address this asymmetry, we must build sets that are tailored to determine
which strategies to admit based on each player’s knowledge independently of the others’.
Each player i will consider what the others might do in light of the information i has gained,
which may include information about the knowledge of others. That knowledge may be
represented by a formula involving arbitrarily many epistemic operators meaning i may
need to assess strategies arbitrarily many steps of reasoning away.
2.5.1 m-Rationalizability
To address questions of the feasibility of implementing such a complicated set of considera-
tions, there is a long tradition in the literature of examining behavior in terms of bounded
rationality [Rub98], in which level of information considered is restricted. This approach
is partly motivated by practical considerations, i.e. actual agents generally have significant
practical limitations on their ability to comprehend long, complicated formulas and use them
in computations.
For any m P N, consider the kind of strategies that arise if each player considers infor-
mation up to m worlds away, and beyond that point, imagines that every prerationalizable
strategy is in play for every player. In a sense, once the knowledge statements become too
complex, the players do not consider them in their strategizing. With this understanding in
mind, the 0-rationalizable strategies are simply the prerationalizable strategies as they are
what results if no knowledge is considered.
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The 1-rationalizable strategies for agent i are the strategies in the set
tα P PripGq | There exist w P W, γ P
nź
k“1
PrkpGq such that
BRpα, PripGq, γ, wq and w ”i w˚u
For m P Z` generally:
Definition 2.5.1. For each j P Nm, 1 ď m1 ă m, j1 P Nm1 let
Zmj pGq “ tα P Prj1pGq | There exist w1, ..., wm P W, γ P
nź
k“1
PrkpGq such that
BRpα, Prj1pGq, γ, w1q and w1 ”j1 w2 ”j2 ... ”jm w˚u
Zmj1 pGq “ tα P Prj11pGq | There exist w1, ..., w1m P W, γ P
nź
k“1
Zmpk,j1qpGq such that
BRpα, Prj1pGq, γ, w1q and w1 ”j11 w2 ”j12 ... ”j1m w˚u
Rmi pGq “ Zmi pGq “ tα P PripGq | There exist w P W, γ P
nź
k“1
Zmpk,iqpGq such that
BRpα, PripGq, γ, wq and w ”i w˚u
Rmi pGq is the set of m-rationalizable strategies in game G for agent i and
RmpGq “śni“1Rmi pGq is the set of m-rationalizable strategy profiles.
Each player jm wishes to respond only to actions that jm´1 might play as a rational
player. To justify the actions on the part of jm´1, jm considers those actions on the part
of jm´2 to which jm´1 may need to respond. This line of thinking will extend up to j1, at
which point jm will stop further consideration of the epistemic situation and simply assume
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that this far down the epistemic chain, j1 responds to every prerationalizable strategy and
then jm works backward through the chain from that basis.
In the language set forth by Parikh [Par17], ZmjpGq is the set of j1 strategies that are
rational relative to the state of knowledge including every possible pair of truth assignments
from a possible w1 with a strategy profile from
śn
k‰j1 PrkpGq. Working back, at each stage,
each player will respond only with strategies that are rational relative to a possible truth
assignment with strategies on the part of the others that are rational relative to their state
of knowledge one further step removed.
Naturally, it ought to be the case that as players consider further information, more
strategies may be eliminated.
Theorem 2.5.1. For each EMG G, i P N , m P N, m1 “ 1, 2, ...,m, and j P Nm1, Zm`1j pGq Ď
Zm`1j pGq, and thus Rm`1i pGq Ď Rmi pGq.
Proof. Fix G and m and suppose j P Nm and k P N . Note that by definition, Zm`1pk,jq Ď Prk.
If α P Zm`1j , then there must exist w1, ..., wm P W and γ P
śn
k“1 Z
m`1
pk,jq such that
BRpα, Prj1 , γ, w1q and w1 ”j1 ... ”jm w˚. The same choice of w1, ..., wm, γ may be used to
show that α P Zmj since γ P
śn
k“1 Prk. Thus Z
m`1
j Ď Zmj .
For 1 ď m1 ă m, j P Nm1 , assume that for each k P N , Zm`1pk,jq Ď Zmpk,jq. If α P Zm`1j ,
then there must exist w1, ..., wm1 P W and γ Pśnk“1 Zm`1pk,jq such that BRpα, Prj1 , γ, w1q and
w1 ”j1 ... ”jm1 w˚. The same choice of w1, ..., wm1 , γ may be used to show that α P Zmj since
γ Pśnk“1 Zmpk,jq. Thus Zm`1j Ď Zmj .
Therefore by induction, the result holds for all choices of m1 and thus all m.
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2.5.2 Rationalizability in EMG Without Common Knowledge
By the traditional definition of common knowledge given by Lewis [Lew08], there is an
infinite chain of nontrivial knowledge statements implied by common knowledge, and so
the reasoning agents use could not possibly be captured by the kind of bounded rationality
described above, or even an infinite limit of such reasoning. It is well known in the literature
that common knowledge cannot be created with certain kinds of communications [HM90].
In subclasses of EMG that do not permit messages that create common knowledge, defining
rationalizability follows precisely the same approach as m-rationalizability with some slight
modification.
In order to ensure a starting point, the set ZjpGq is first subject to testing whether there
is in fact any knowledge to be gained by looking out to further steps in the reasoning. If
at any point we reach a world with an empty history, it cannot be the case that anything
further can be said about the reasoning of player beyond that point, since as far as they are
concerned (as far as the chain of reasoning can tell) any truth assignment is possible, and
thus all of their prerationalizable strategies are in play. Of course there is no guarantee of the
existence of such a chain of worlds in all cases, but when they are available, this condition
plainly reflects the kind of reasoning a rational player uses in determining whether further
computations will yield useful results.
Definition 2.5.2. For each m “ 1, 2, ... and j “ pj1, j2, ..., jmq P Nm, and define the set
ZjpGq as follows:
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ZjpGq “ Prj1pGq if there exist w1, w2, ..., wm P W such that H1 is empty and
w1 ”j1 w2 ”j2 ... ”jm w˚
Otherwise,
ZjpGq “ tα P Prj1pGq | There exist w1, ..., wm P W, γ P
nź
k“1
Zpk,jqpGq such that
BRpα, Prj1pGq, γ, w1q and w1 ”j1 w2 ”j2 ... ”jm w˚u
The set of rationalizable strategies for player i, RipGq is given by
RipGq “ ZipGq “ tα P PripGq | There exist w P W, γ P
nź
k“1
Zpk,iqpGq such that
BRpα, PripGq, γ, wq and w ”i w˚u
(each is defined assuming the well-definition of the requisite sets, which we will show is
guaranteed at least for certain subclasses of EMG)
2.6 Propositional Asynchronous Messages
We now restrict our attention to a subclass of EMG in which players may only send propo-
sitional formulas as messages and there is only one type of message available to send, called
asynchronous (single recipient) messages. These messages result in very small transfers of
information, and notably cannot create common knowledge, making them a good starting
point in this exploration.
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The most important feature of asynchronous messages for the present purposes is that
they are never guaranteed to be delivered and the sender has no built-in mechanism for
determining whether the message was in fact received at all. This means that the sender
can never gain any knowledge by sending any message in this way, regardless of whether it
is actually received.
These are precisely the kinds of messages examined in the Coordinated Attack Problem,
originally proposed by Gray [Gra78]. In the problem, two generals are planning to stage
an attack against an enemy, but will only be victorious if they attack simultaneously, thus
they must coordinate their efforts. They can only communicate via messengers, who may
be captured or otherwise disrupted en route, and thus the messages are not guaranteed to
be delivered, and if they do, there is no way for the delivery to be confirmed to the sender
without relying on further messages of the same kind, thus perpetuating the issue. Halpern
and Moses famously showed that under these circumstances, it is impossible for the generals
to coordinate their attack [HM90].
Many real life communications fundamentally behave in this manner. Posted letters,
single recipient emails and text messages, and historically telegraphy all have structural
similarities, in that senders have no guarantee or notification of delivery. Presently, certain
text message systems have delivery confirmation mechanisms, at least between users of the
same system, fundamentally changing the information dynamics at play, though these cases
are not addressed directly in this work.
For the length of this section, let G be a game for which M “ LpP q and Y “ tχ1u, where
only additional restriction for the message type χ1 is that for any event σχ1s,Rpϕq, R must be
a singleton set tru, for which we will abbreviate the event σχ1s,rpϕq. Consequently, because of
the condition requiring a receive event to be preceded by a corresponding send event, it will
also be the case that any event ρχ1s,Rpϕq will also have R as a singleton, abbreviated similarly
as ρχ1s,rpϕq.
CHAPTER 2. RATIONALIZABILITY IN EPISTEMIC GAMES 32
Regardless of the language of the messages, the reception of an asynchronous message
results in a clear cut change to the epistemic situation. In a world w in which the event
ρυs,rpϕq appears, it will be the case that w |ù KrKsϕ. As seen previously, this holds for any
message type υ, but what sets χ1 apart is that this is the only potential change to the states
of knowledge.
Because in this case M includes only propositional formulas, it will not be possible for
any agent to have knowledge about others more than one epistemic step removed from
themselves.
Theorem 2.6.1. If M Ď LpP q, Y “ tχ1u, i, j, k P N , i ‰ j, and j ‰ k, then for all
w P W and ϕ P LpP q (except tautologies), there exist w1, w2, w3 P W such that H1 is empty,
w1 ”k w2 ”j w3 ”i w, and w1 * ϕ and so w * KiKjKkϕ.
Proof. Let w3 be given by ν3 “ ν and H3 consisting of the four sequences S1S2S3S4. Let S4
be the subsequence of events in H visible to i. Let S3 include all of the corresponding send
events to any receive events for which i is the receiver. Let S2 be a sequence of events of the
form ρχ10,rpψq, one for each sender in S3 such that ψ implies the conjunction of the messages
sent by r in S3. Finally, let S1 include each of the corresponding send events for the events
in S2.
Let w2 be given by ν2 “ ν and H2 consisting the event σχ10,jpψq from H3 followed by the
subsequence of events in H3 visible to j.
Clearly, none of the events of H2 are visible to k (because k ‰ j), so let H1 be empty,
and ν1 be some truth assignment for which ν1 * ϕ.
If ϕ was not propositional, let any subsequent worlds needed also have empty histories,
changing out the truth assignment as needed.
What the conclusion of this theorem tells us about the way i will reason about j’s possibly
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available strategies is that since it cannot be the case that KiKjKkϕ, then as far as i knows,
j may be forced to respond to any of the prerationalizable strategies on the part of k, for
any k ‰ j. From the above theorem and the definition of Zpk,j,iqpGq, the following corollary
holds.
Corollary. If M Ď LpP q, Y “ tχ1u, i, j, k P N , i ‰ j, and j ‰ k, then Zpk,j,iqpGq “ PrkpGq.
Therefore for each i, RipGq “ R2i pGq.
Theorem 2.6.2. If G and G1 are identical games with asynchronous propositional messages
except that w˚ “ pν,Hq and w1˚ “ pν,Hhq for some event h, then RpG1q Ď RpGq.
Proof. Let α P RpG1q. This means there must be w1 P W, γ Pśnj“1 Zpj,iqpG1q such that
BRpα, PripG1q, γ, w1q and w1 ”i w1˚ .
By the above corollary, Zpk,j,iqpGq “ PrkpGq “ PrkpG1q “ Zpk,j,iqpG1q. This means that
since γ Pśnj“1 Zpj,iqpG1q, by definition, for each j there must be w11, w12 P W,
γ1 Pśnk“1 PrkpG1q such that BRpγj, P rjpG1q, γ1, w11q and w11 ”j w12 ”i w1˚ .
Note that if h is visible to i, it is not visible to any other agent, since all messages have
one recipient.
Regardless of the content of h, let w2 be the maximal length prefix of w
1
2 such that
w2 ”i w˚. This is achieved by deleting the tail of w12 beginning with the corresponding event
to h if it is visible to i, and otherwise it is simply w12 itself. Similarly, let w1 be the maximal
length prefix of w1˚ such that w1 ”j w2.
Since w1 and w
1
1 have the same truth assignment, it must be the case thatBRpγj, P rj, γ1, w1q
and so γj P Zpj,iqpGq. Therefore śnj“1 Zpj,iqpG1q Ďśnj“1 Zpj,iqpGq.
By a similar construction, let w be the maximal length prefix of w1 such that w ”i w˚.
As previously, it must be the case that BRpα, PripGq, γ, wq and so α P RipGq.
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By iterating the process of this proof, a proof of the following more general version of
the theorem can be constructed.
Corollary. If G and G1 are identical games with asynchronous propositional messages except
that w˚ ď w1˚ , then RpG1q Ď RpGq.
Plainly, additional communication via asynchronous messages can only reduce the num-
ber of rationalizable strategies available to each player.
2.6.1 Example
The following is a modified version of an example originally presented by Parikh, involving
a rather unusual and dramatic set of circumstances [Par17]:
Example. Going about her usual business at home, Barb hears a rumbling from her neighbor
Ann’s apartment. On further examination, she comes to the undeniably strange conclusion
that there is a tiger in Ann’s bathroom. With Ann having gone to work for the day some
hours earlier, Barb has no idea whether Ann is even aware of the circumstance, and worries
that if Ann enters the room, she may be mauled by the tiger. As a good neighbor, Barb has
no desire to see Ann eaten, but must herself leave for some important business.
Barb considers her options. Having spoken with Ann the night before, Barb knows that
Ann broke her phone, and cannot have gotten a replacement so soon. It seems the only way
to warn Ann about the tiger is to leave a note on Ann’s front door, hoping she sees it when
she returns.
Once Barb leaves the note, of course there is no way for her to know whether the message
is received, since in the meantime it could fall off the door or perhaps be removed by whatever
villain may have put the tiger there in the first place. Still, wanting to help as much as
possible, Barb leaves a spare key to her apartment where Ann can find it in case she needs
anything upon her return (perhaps to use the bathroom).
CHAPTER 2. RATIONALIZABILITY IN EPISTEMIC GAMES 35
Ann
Barb
leave key no key
own br ´20000,´2 ´20000, 0
B’s br ´5,´7 ´100,´100
tiger
Ann
Barb
leave key no key
own br 10,´2 10, 0
B’s br ´5,´7 ´100,´100
no tiger
Figure 2.1: Payoff matrices for tiger in the bathroom
The payoff matrices in figure 2.1 show the utilities of the action profiles available to the
two depending on the proposition tiger, where Barb must choose between leaving her key
or not, and Ann between using her own bathroom or Barb’s.
Ann’s payoffs remain as they were in the original presentation, except now in the case
where Barb does not leave a key, Ann will need to break in to use Barb’s bathroom, which
presents a number of openings for negative consequences, thus the large negative utility
(though not nearly as large as that of being mauled by a tiger).
Barb’s payoffs stem from the minor risks associated with leaving her key out where anyone
can find it in addition to the social awkwardness of having Ann in her home without being
present. If Barb doesn’t leave a key, there is no change in her fortunes as long as Ann
doesn’t need to get into her apartment, but if Ann breaks in, a number of possible negative
consequences may result. Notice that none of these payoffs depend on whether there is in
fact a tiger.
With the setup in place, we can explore the changes to each player’s rationalizable strate-
gies through the sequence of events. First, the prerationalizable strategies include all of the
available actions for both players. Whatever strategy Barb is employing, Ann is better off
using Barb’s bathroom if there is a tiger, and her own if there isn’t. Regardless of whether
there is a tiger, Barb benefits from not leaving a key if Ann opts to use her own bathroom,
and from leaving the key otherwise.
Once the communication commences, nature sends Barb the message that the tiger is in
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Ann’s bathroom. At that point, the rationalizable strategies would remain equivalent to the
prerationalizable strategies, since Barb cannot rule out either of Ann’s strategies, and thus
must potentially respond to both. Since Ann’s state of knowledge hasn’t changed, clearly
neither has her set of rationalizable strategies.
At that point, Barb decides to leave the note, sending Ann the asynchronous message
that the tiger is in her bathroom. Once Ann receives the note, she learns that Barb knows
that the tiger is there, but more importantly that the tiger is actually there. At that point,
she can rule out the strategy of using her own bathroom, since she now knows about the
tiger, and so using her own bathroom is a strictly dominated strategy. Since Barb is not
aware of any of this, her rationalizable strategies haven’t changed, and so she may or may
not have left a key.
Of course, this treatment does not tell the whole story of why Barb chooses the specific
strategy she does, since rationalizability is designed to point out the strategies that may
be of use under some circumstance the player may think possible, not to predict the single
best strategy in the face of incomplete information. On a similar note, it seems that before
receiving the note, Ann would proceed without even considering the possibility that there
is a tiger at all, as most of us generally do in our daily lives. While in practice it would
almost never be the case that Ann would break into her neighbor’s apartment to use the
bathroom without definitive proof of an emergency, rationalizability is not built to rule out
the exceptionally unlikely circumstance that the tiger represents, thus this strategy is still
considered rationalizable simply in the absence of proof that there is no tiger.
2.7 Conclusion and Future Work
This work offers a general approach to issues of rationality with respect to games with
epistemic considerations. The case addressed represents only the very first of a wide variety
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of potential uses for this approach. The next step is to expand to broader classes of games,
notably by expanding the set of possible messages to include epistemic formulas, as in the
following example.
Example. Consider the 3-player game in which 1 has two available actions a1 and a2, 2
also has two actions b1 and b2, and 3 can only play the single action c. Payoffs also depend
on the truth value of the proposition p, specified by the following payoff matrices:
Agent1
Agent 2
b1 b2
a1 1, 1, 1 0, 0, 1
a2 0, 1, 0 1, 0, 0
p true
Agent 1
Agent 2
b1 b2
a1 1, 0, 1 0, 1, 1
a2 0, 0, 0 1, 1, 0
p false
Figure 2.2: Payoff matrices for a three player epistemic game
Notice that the set of prerationalizable strategy profiles includes every possible combination
of strategies, as 1 will always prefer to play a1 if 2 plays b1 and b2 is preferable to b1 when p
is true, and similarly for a2 and b2 (plus the fact that c is the only action available to 3 so
it must be prerationalizable).
Suppose that 2 learns that p is true. Now the set of rationalizable strategies for 2 will
contract to only include b1. If 2 then sends 3 the message p (perhaps inadvertently since
2 has no incentive to do so) there is no change to the rationalizable strategies, but 3 gains
the opportunity to affect the knowledge state of 1, in turn affecting 3’s potential payoff in a
positive way.
If at this point 3 can only send a propositional message, there would be no potential benefit
to doing so. The action 1 will take is not dependent on the truth value of p at all, nor is it
dependent on any knowledge about 3’s strategy, since there is only one in the first place. The
only knowledge that will sway 1’s decision defininitively is which action 2 will take. While
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this action is set, and 3 knows it, there is no way for 3 to transmit that knowledge to 1.
If instead 3 can send the more expressive message K2p to 1, at that point the only ratio-
nalizable strategy profile will be pa1, b1, cq and every player will receive their maximal available
payoff.
This clearly demonstrates the potential strategic benefits of expanding the available mes-
sages, but what of other ways the class of games can be expanded or modified? There
remains significant territory to explore in the form of different message types, even within
the realm of asynchronous messages by changing the structure of the message recipients to
include multiple recipients, with CC and BCC designations and more.
Already discussed earlier was the issue of messages that create common knowledge, in-
cluding public announcements and instantaneous messages. It is readily apparent that the
given definition of rationalizability will not suffice under such circumstances, though the
work may provide a good starting point for approaching a proper definition in that context.
The above example is also a useful demonstration of a situation in which it is strategically
beneficial for an agent to send a message, even in a circumstance in which it is not guaranteed
to be delivered. After 3 finds out that 2 knows that p is true, 3 has a clear incentive for
taking steps to inform 1 of this situation, even though 3 cannot directly act in response to
1’s new epistemic state.
The current definition of rationalizability only addresses the issue once the communi-
cation has taken place, while there are clearly rationality considerations to address in the
communications themselves. For another example, consider the following from The Man of
Destiny by G.B. Shaw:
Example. Napoleon has in his possession an unopened letter which presumably confirms
that his wife Josephine has been unfaithful to him. A strange lady attempts to intercept the
letter before Napoleon reads it, though when he asks why she doesn’t want him to read the
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letter, she has no answer. Having rooted out the lady’s intentions, Napoleon tells her:
Next time you are asked why a letter compromising a wife should not be sent to
her husband, answer simply that the husband would not read it. Do you suppose,
little innocent, that a man wants to be compelled by public opinion to make a
scene, to fight a duel, to break up his household, to injure his career by a scandal,
when he can avoid it all by taking care not to know?
While it is obvious, at least to the audience, that Napoleon is already aware of Josephine’s
infidelity, the point he is making is that by confirming that knowledge to the outside world
he would be left with an undesirable set of possible courses of action, so he strategically
manipulates his own knowledge, or at least the outside perceptions of his knowledge to
maintain a more comfortable set of choices. Again, the rationality of the communications
themselves is at issue in this case, anticipating (by at least 120 years) possible extensions of
the work in this paper.
One additional observation regarding the 3-player example earlier in this section is that
the incentive for 3 is to convince 1 to perform action a1 is present regardless of the other
circumstances. Because of this fact, if players were allowed to send messages that are untrue
and the situation played out in exactly the same way, 1 would be justified in disbelieving 3’s
message, since 3 would have incentive for 1 believing that K2p regardless of whether it was
true.
It would seem that opening up the possibility of dishonest agents would create a total
breakdown in communication, though clearly that does not occur in practice, and some
work has already been done on the subject of modeling communication with dishonest
senders [VDVESW12]. Since game theoretic models of communication are already common,
the framework presented here may allow this area to be explored further in the direction
of adapting game theoretic solution concepts in the face of dishonesty to better represent
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strategic situations in real life.
Finally, the only solution concept addressed so far in this manner is pure strategy ra-
tionalizability, while other solution concepts, in particular mixed strategy rationalizability
and Nash equilibria to name two, could be explored in terms of these kinds of history based
models as well.
These and many more possible avenues for continuing research in this area make for an
ambitious project, that is to generalize game theoretic concepts to various kinds of situations
with epistemic considerations, to say nothing of the applications of such research to artificial
intelligence, economics, and other disciplines. Hopefully these first steps provide a useful
set of tools for such work to build upon and extend our understanding of the interactions
between knowledge and behavior.
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